Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 3: Country Studies - Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey by Robert S. Dohner & Ponciano Intal, Jr.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume
3: Country Studies - Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-30455-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/sach89-2
Conference Date: September 21-23, 1987
Publication Date: 1989
Chapter Title: Government Interventions and Rent Seeking
Chapter Author: Robert S. Dohner, Ponciano Intal, Jr.
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9050
Chapter pages in book: (p. 460 - 481)460  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
The combination of trade protection,  investment  incentives,  and domestic 
growth propelled by investment  and construction  took its toll on Philippine 
industry.  Output shifted  toward more  capital-intensive,  lower productivity 
industries,  limiting the growth that the Philippines  got out of  its investment 
and  foreign  borrowing.  But  these  industries  were  also dependent on  the 
continued  momentum of  borrowing  and  investment  and  proved  extremely 
vulnerable to the recession of the early 1980s. The sharp declines in many of 
these industries worsened the recession in the early 1980s, and many of these 
firms  ended  up  in  the  hands  of  the  government,  either  through  rescue 
operations or the assumption of guaranteed  external loan obligations. 
4  Government Interventions and 
Rent Seeking 
In the popular imagination  the legacy of the Marcos administration  was the 
accumulation of vast wealth by Ferdinand Marcos, his family members, and 
various  individuals,  or “cronies,”  who were closely  associated  with  him. 
Corruption  and  the  accumulation  of  wealth  through  government  did  not 
originate with Marcos, nor was it unusual  in the Philippines  as opposed to 
other countries  in or outside the region.  But the scale on which corruption 
and the generation of rents took place in the Philippines under Marcos was at 
a qualitatively different  level.  What observers in the Philippines  referred to 
as crony capitalism, and what  less charitable  observers outside the country 
referred to as “government by kleptocracy,”  was of such a scale as to have 
macroeconomic  consequences, and plays its own important role in the slide 
of  the Philippines into crisis. 
The use  of  government power to generate and  distribute wealth,  what 
economists  have  termed  “government  rent  seeking”  had  three  critical 
consequences. First, quasi-governmental  control  and monopolization  of  the 
two principal commodity export crops, sugar and coconuts, was responsible 
for much of the sluggish growth of traditional and total exports. Second, the 
particularistic  way  in which the government issued regulations  and granted 
access  to  credit  to  favored  firms  and  the  way  in  which  crony  business 
empires were  built  weakened  and  demoralized  the  private,  nonassociated 
business  sector  and  encouraged  capital  flight.  Finally,  when  the  crony 
empires dissolved in the 1980s, the government was left with a huge burden 
of  failed  assets,  called  loan  guarantees,  and  unmet  domestic  payment 
obligations,  creating  a  fiscal  problem  of  major dimensions. We  start our 
story  with  two  of  the  most  insidious  interventions,  those  in  sugar  and 
coconuts. 461  PhilippineKhapter 4 
4.1  Government Interventions in Sugar and Coconuts 
The  exports  of  the  Philippines  have  historically  been  dominated  by 
coconut and sugar products,  although logs and lumber were very important 
during  the  1960s. Coconuts  and  sugar  accounted  for  about  three-fifths  of 
total  exports during the  1950s and about one-half  during the  1960s. Their 
export share dropped, however, to one-third by the late 1970s and to about 
one-fifth by the early 1980s. This drop was partly a consequence of the sharp 
rise  of  nontraditional  manufactured  exports  during  the  period,  but  also 
reflected sluggish growth in output and weak international prices for the two 
crops. Both industries had grown rapidly in the ten years before martial law, 
and there were optimistic projections and investment  commitments  in  both 
sectors.  But  the  world  market  turned  out  to  be  far  less  favorable  than 
foreseen,  forcing  severe  problems  in  each  industry.  In  addition,  the 
organization  and  trading  arrangements  changed  decisively  during  martial 
law, in ways that weakened  both  sectors and impeded adjustment. 
4.1.1  Sugar 
Before the 1970s, the sugar industry benefitted enormously from its access 
to the protected U.S. market, which offered prices substantially higher than 
the world  market.  The absence of export taxation in the Philippines  meant 
that  much  of  the  U.S.  sugar  price  premium  was  captured  by  Philippine 
producers.  Government  involvement  in  the  industry  was  limited  to  the 
allocation  of  the  quota  for  export  to  the  United  States,  although  the 
Philippine  government  forced  sugar  producers  to  satisfy  a  domestic  sales 
requirement in order to export, and this kept domestic prices below the U.S. 
level. 
Because of the privileged  access to the U.S. market, the small number of 
sugar producers, and the highly skewed distribution of  sugar land ownership, 
several  sugar  planters  and  millers  became  enormously  rich.  Using  their 
wealth,  they  also  diversified  into  other  areas  of  the  Philippine  economy. 
Their economic prominence translated into political influence and, for a few 
of  them, tremendous  political  clout during the pre-martial  law days. They 
formed part of what Marcos called the Philippine oligarchy, who he attacked 
shortly  after the  martial  law  declaration  and tried  to replace  with  his own 
cronies.  The  conflict  within  the  ruling  elite  provided  the  sociopolitical 
subtext to the government interventions in the economy in general and in the 
sugar industry in particular during the  1970s. 
Two events in  the  early  1960s  greatly  benefitted  the  Philippine  sugar 
industry. The first was the devaluation and import decontrol that took place 
between  1960 and 1962, which shifted price incentives in favor of the export 
sector. The second was the suspension of  Cuba’s quota for sugar exports to 
the  U.S.  market  after  Castro nationalized  the  industry  in  1960, and  its 
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Philippine  land  area planted  to  sugar increased  by  80 percent  between 
1960 and  1972. The Philippine government also supported the expansion of 
sugar milling capacity through financial support from the Philippine National 
Bank. The number of  operating sugar mills rose by 40 percent between 1967 
and  1974. 
The  1970s began  a  period  of  upheaval  for  the  industry.  During  the 
commodities boom  of  the early  1970s the world price of  sugar rose sharply 
from under 7 cents to over 30 cents a pound  in  1974. As important  for the 
Philippines was that the world market price rose above the controlled price in 
the  U.S. market.  During  that  year,  the U.S. Congress  failed  to renew the 
Sugar Act of  1948 and the U.S. quota system came to an end. 
The  termination  of  the  U.S. sugar  import quota  forced  the  Philippine 
sugar industry to operate within a far more volatile world market. The price 
of  sugar declined dramatically in  1975 and  1976, rose sharply in  1980, and 
then declined precipitously  during the early  1980s. Beyond the volatility  in 
prices,  developments in the world  sugar market during the latter  1970s and 
early 1980s tended to depress the secular trend in world sugar prices. These 
included  the  decline  in  per  capita  sugar  consumption  in  a  number  of 
developed  countries,  the  significant  inroads  into  the  sweetener  market, 
particularly for industrial purposes, of  sugar substitutes such as high fructose 
corn  syrup,  the  substantial  productivity  improvements  in  sugar  beet 
production, and European Economic Community price support policy which 
turned the EC into a net sugar exporter.’ 
In  order to capture  some of the  windfall  from the  1970 devaluation,  the 
Philippine government  imposed  export taxes  on commodity  exports,  with 
the highest  rates on sugar, copra, and log exports. In  1974 the government 
imposed premium  taxes  on sugar  and  other commodity  exports to capture 
some of the international commodity price rise. Government control of  sugar 
trading started that year when, after the increase in world  sugar prices and 
the  growing  scarcity  of  sugar  in  the  domestic  market,  the  government 
ordered PNB, the major financier of the sugar industry through crop loans to 
planters  and  investment  loans to millers,  to purchase  the  sugar crop. The 
bank’s subsidiary, the Philippine Exchange Company (PHILEX), was given 
responsibility for all sugar exporting. 
The  rationale  behind  the  takeover  of  sugar  trading  was  to  stabilize 
domestic sugar prices and prevent private hoarding. It drew on the historical 
bias  in  the  Philippines  against  middlemen  (who  tended  to  be  Chinese 
Filipinos) in the agriculture sector and the popular feeling that profits from 
agriculture  had  often  gone  to  the  “monopolistic”  traders  and  not  to  the 
farmers.  In  taking over sugar trading  the  government  declared  its  “single 
agency”  concept, wherein a single trading agency would replace “a system 
of  excessive dependence on individual selling efforts, coursed traditionally 
through brokers or middlemen [in order to have] better control of  supply and 
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The decision  enabled  PNB to capture large  rents  from the  export price 
surge  of  1974, since  the  prices  paid  to farmers were  substantially  below 
prices  realized  from sugar sales.  At this point PHILEX overreached  itself. 
Expecting a continued rise in world  sugar prices, the agency held back its 
sales from  the  world  market,  accumulating  inventories  in  the  Philippines. 
When  world  prices  dropped,  PHILEX  was  forced  to  sell  the  already 
deteriorating stocks of sugar at a substantial loss in  1977. And, in order to 
maintain  the  domestic  purchase  price,  PHILEX  was  forced  to  borrow 
heavily. 
In  1977  control  over  sugar trading  was  transferred  from  PNB  to  the 
recently  created  Philippine  Sugar  Commission  (Philsucom)  headed  by 
Roberto  Benedicto,  a  fraternity  brother  of  Marcos’  from  his  law  school 
days.3  The  trading  arm  of  Philsucom,  the  National  Sugar  Trading 
Corporation (NASUTRA),  was given  sole authority to trade sugar domesti- 
cally  and  internationally,  as well  as to set purchase  prices  for milled  and 
unmilled  sugar.  Under Philsucom’s  direction,  the  Republic  Planters  Bank, 
controlled by Benedicto, became the principal private financial institution for 
the sugar industry. 
Although  the government  takeover  of  sugar trading had ostensibly  been 
undertaken to limit monopoly rents in the industry,  it in fact substituted its 
own monopoly for the one that had allegedly existed before.  The net effect 
of  the  government’s  direct  interventions  in  the  sugar  industry  during the 
1970s  and  early  1980s  was  that  the  price  that  sugar  producers  received 
declined  as  a  share  of  the  world  market  price.  Before  1974 the  domestic 
sugar producers received a price for sugar roughly 60 percent higher than the 
world  market price,  due to premium  enjoyed  under the U.S. sugar import 
program.  Although  domestic  sales,  accounting  for  about  35 percent  of 
Philippine production, were below the U.S.  price, they still were higher than 
the world market price. 
After 1974 there was a dramatic shift toward effective taxation of the sugar 
industry. Retail prices of sugar were highly visible and politically sensitive, and 
the Philippine government sought to keep them below world market levels. 
During the 1974-82 period, domestic prices for sugar averaged only 69  percent 
of world market prices (Nelson and Agcaoili 1983,23). In addition, prices paid 
by NASUTRA were in most years well below realized prices on the agency’s 
international sales. A University of the Philippines workshop study estimated 
that the difference amounted to P.  5.4  billion between  1974 and  1984, or 17 
percent of the revenue that NASUTRA reali~ed.~  If we use the International 
Sugar Agreement price as the relevant border price for the Philippines, there 
was a net income transfer to the sugar farmers averaging 38 percent of the value 
of output during 1960-7  1; during 1972-82  there was a net income loss to sugar 
farmers averaging 30 percent (table 4.1). 
NASUTRA and its parent agency, Philsucom, expanded the government’s 
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Table 4.1  Nominal Rate of Protection and Transfers: Sugar 
Nominal Rate of  Transfers"  Ratio of Transfer to 
Protcction (%)  (P. million)  Value of Output ('70) 





















-  27 
-  63 





-  54 
-  18 
73 
-9 
-  17 
-  24 
-  20 
-  18 
-  24 
-  52 
-  55 
-  21 
-  19 
7 
37 
-  23 






-  195.6 
-  909.4 
-6.576.7 





-  5,801.9 










-  1,278.9 
-  808.9 
3.0 
48.9 
-  1.498.0 
-3.217.5 






-  38. I 
-161.1 





-  117.9 
42.2 
-  22.3 
-  10.8 





-  106.3 





-  30.4 
-  58.5 
-8.1 
Source:  lntal and Power (1987) 
aTransfers are equal to the difference between the actual price received by the producer and the border price. 
multiplied by the volume of  output. 
'Annual  averages. 
ISA  = border price based on the International Sugar Agreement daily price 
XUP = export unit value. 
in  transport,  bulk  storage,  and  handling  of  sugar  and  sugarcane,  and  by 
establishing  new  sugar  refineries  and  operating  sugar  centrals  (Intal  and 
Power  1987, 47-48). 
The construction  of  sugar  mills  was  a  source  of  corruption  and  wealth 
generation.  Before  the  declaration  of  martial  law,  a  Senate Blue  Ribbon 
Committee challenged the Marcos government on the construction of  sugar 
mills by Japanese firms that had no previous experience in mill construction, 
and the  fact that the cost of  these  mills  substantially  exceeded  the cost of 
construction of mills of equivalent capacity in other countries (Canlas et al. 
1984, 88). Despite the crisis due to mounting sugar inventories in  1975 and 
1976  and  problems  already  existing  from  excess  milling  capacity,  the 
Philippine government  allowed the establishment  of  new  sugar centrals by 
politically favored individuals,  including the country's  sugar administrator, 
Roberto Benedicto. The profits in these sugar mills usually occurred during 
their  construction  through  overpricing  of  the  project  accompanied  by 
kickbacks (Wideman  1976, 54-55).  The investments in turn were financed 
by loans or guarantees from PNB. 
During the period after  1974, productivity  in the domestic sugar industry 
stagnated. Output growth during the 1960s and 1970s was through extensive 
means-expansion  in sugar hectarage  and the establishment of sugar mills. 465  PhilippineKhapter 4 
As sugar growing was extended to less suitable land, the  growth in output 
was accompanied  by a decline in sugar yield per hectare.  It  was only  with 
the reduction in  sugar hectarage during the late  1970s and early  1980s that 
there  was  some  improvement  in  farm  productivity;  nonetheless,  farm 
productivity  and processing efficiency during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
remained below that of the early  1960s. 
After four years of low levels, world sugar prices jumped sharply in 1980, 
leading to a dramatic recovery in the Philippine sugar industry. At the height 
of  the price cycle, NASUTRA  signed contracts to deliver  565,000 tons of 
sugar per year (about half of Philippine exports) between  1981 and 1984, at 
a price of  23.5 cents per pound.  This proved  to be a particularly  fortunate 
move, as world prices plummeted in the  1980s, dropping to just over 5 cents 
per  pound  in  1984. In  1981, the  United  States reinstated  its  sugar import 
quota, giving the Philippines a quota of 342,000 tons for the 1982 crop year. 
Production costs in the Philippines have been estimated to be 14- 15 cents 
per pound, well above the world market price in the 1980s. The combination 
of  the  long-term  contracts  signed  by  NASUTRA  and  U.S.  quota sales at 
about  18 cents per  pound  sustained  the  industry  in the  early  years  of  the 
decade. But the  U.S.  import quota shrank significantly  in  succeeding crop 
years,  and the long-term contracts NASUTRA  had  signed expired in  1984. 
The next  year  was  a  particularly  disastrous  one.  World  sugar prices  fell 
further, and Philippine production fell by 16 percent. NASUTRA was unable 
to maintain the domestic producer support price for sugar and failed to pay 
many producers for the  1985 crop year. This in turn led to a collapse in the 
sugar  industry  support system  and  widespread  malnutrition  in  some sugar 
producing  areas  such  as Negros  Occidental.  In  1986 the  Philippine  sugar 
crop  fell  precipitously  to a  level  of  35 percent  below  that  of  1984. The 
Philippines  was  forced  to  import  sugar in  order to  meet  its  (now  much 
smaller) U.S. import quota. 
The troubles of the Philippine sugar industry reflect in part the adjustment 
problems  of  an  increasingly  less  efficient  producer,  which  no  longer  had 
privileged  access  to  a  large  and  protected  export  market.  However,  the 
nature of the government interventions and the manner of their implementa- 
tion  aggravated  the  structural  adjustment  problems  of  the  Philippine  sugar 
industry. The failure of  the Philippine government in its interventions in the 
sugar industry during the  1970s was due fundamentally  to its focus on the 
control of the sugar trade and on industry expansion, rather than on industry 
rationalization  and  an  increase  in  farm productivity,  processing  efficiency, 
and  crop  or  product  diversification.  The  bullish  government  assumption 
about  the  long-term trends  in the  world  sugar market proved  to be  far too 
optimistic.  What aggravated the adjustment problem in the Philippine sugar 
industry  was that the  two government  interventions provided  opportunities 
for rent seeking and political control. The PHILEX price speculation fiasco, 
export taxation,  and the relative inefficiency  of the marketing operations of 466  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
the  government  sugar trading agency exacted a heavy burden  on the  sugar 
producers. 
4.1.2  Coconuts 
Government  intervention  in  coconut  pricing  and  marketing  has  been 
significant  only  since the  1970s.  Nonetheless,  the  interventions  have  been 
more controversial than those in the sugar industry for several reasons. First, 
the interventions affected a much larger proportion  of Filipino farmers than 
the  interventions  in  sugar.  Despite  the  historical  prominence  of  sugar in 
Philippine public policy, sugar farms account for only about 1 percent of the 
total number of farms and about 4 percent of the total farm area. In contrast, 
coconut  farms  account  for  nearly  one-fifth  of  all  farms  and  nearly 
one-quarter of farm area. Second, the interventions created a parastatal but 
legally private bureaucracy that disposed of large funds and was outside the 
purview  of  government  auditing regulations.  Finally,  although  designed  to 
make long-term investments and assist in restructuring and crop replanting in 
the industry,  the funds collected were used to effect the vertical integration 
of  the  coconut  industry,  to  establish  monopoly  control, and  ultimately  to 
enrich  the  Philippine  defense  minister  and  a  crony  of  the  Marcos 
government. 
Government  intervention  in  the  coconut  industry  came  initially  out  of 
pressure  from  the  Coconut  Producers  Federation  (COCOFED), the  largest 
organization  of  planters.  COCOFED  pressed  for  and  got  the  Philippine 
Congress  to  pass  Republic  Act  6260  in  1971  creating  the  Coconut 
Investment Fund and the Coconut Investment Company to administer it. The 
aims of  the Coconut  Investment  Fund  were  to establish  regional  banks  in 
partnership with the farmers and the central bank, to mobilize bank loans for 
long-term investment in coconut marketing and processing, and to encourage 
manpower  development  (ILMS  198  1).  In  the  vertical  integration  program 
pushed  by  COCOFED, the farmers would  gain  control  of  the trading  and 
processing  subsectors  of  the  coconut  industry.  The  Coconut  Investment 
Company was to be funded from a small levy on the first sale of  copra, and 
a part of the levy was to go to the support of  the federation as the primary 
representative of  the industry. 
The proposals  of  COCOFED were  essentially  reactions  to  the  apparent 
neglect of the sector by the government and antipathy toward the middlemen 
who controlled processing and marketing.  Before the  1970s, the government 
barely  acknowledged  the  coconut  industry  and  did  not  try  to  promote 
coconut  exports,  nor  were  there  programs  of  research  or  agricultural 
extension in the industry.  In addition,  a substantial share of  copra financing 
and  trading  and  coconut  oil  manufacturing  was  controlled  by  Chinese 
Filipinos and foreigners. The later interventions in the industry were able to 
draw  on  sentiment  against  these  two  groups;  the  use  of  the  coconut  levy 
during  the  1970s to  establish  a  bank,  buy  coconut  mills,  and  establish 467  Philippines/Chapter 4 
coconut marketing centers were efforts at “de-alienization”  of the coconut 
trading and processing sectors (Intal and Power 1987). 
The next initiative came from the martial law  government in  1973. Early 
in the year the government had established the Philippine Coconut Authority 
to implement policy in the industry. A small crop in the Philippines and for 
other coconut producers led to a shortage of  copra and high world prices. 
The sharp rise in the world price of coconut oil led to domestic scarcity of 
coconut  oil,  resulting  in  acute  shortages  of  cooking  oil,  laundry  soap, 
margarine,  and  other coconut-based consumer products.  In  response,  the 
government imposed price controls on domestic coconut-based products and 
created  the  Coconut  Consumer  Stabilization  Fund  (CCSF),  which  the 
Coconut Authority  used  to  compensate product  manufacturers who  were 
caught between spiralling input costs and the price ceilings imposed by  the 
Price Control Council. The CCSF was funded through a levy of  150 pesos 
per  metric  ton,  or  roughly  12  percent  of  world  prices.  Although  the 
stabilization fund was  supposed to be  a temporary measure,  its aims and 
those of the Coconut Investment Fund were merged in 1974 by a presidential 
decree that allowed the stabilization fund to set aside part of  its revenues to 
fund investment, extension, and research and development in the industry. 
Later  in  1974 a  second  presidential decree  created the  Coconut  Industry 
Development Fund,  to  be  funded  out  of  the  accumulated  levies  of  the 
stabilization fund as well as the levy on copra sales, now raised to 200 pesos 
per metric ton. One of the first acts of the development fund was to finance 
the  establishment and  operation of  a  new  hybrid  coconut  seednut farm, 
which grew a higher-yielding MalaysiadIvory Coast variety, and was owned 
by  Eduardo Cojuangco. The seednut farm was to be the basis of a long-term 
replanting program for the industry. 
In  December  1974 the Philippine Coconut Authority’s governing board 
was reorganized and  was now  made up of  the chairman and president of 
PNB and five members from COCOFED. In  1975 the Authority approved 
the use of funds collected from levies on coconut sales to purchase a bank, to 
be owned by the farmers, that would provide finance to the coconut industry. 
The Coconut Authority bought the major interest in the ailing First United 
Bank, which was renamed the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The 
bank’s  president  was  Eduardo  Cojuangco,  who  also  had  a  7  percent 
ownership share,  and its board chairman was Juan Ponce Enrile,  Marcos’ 
defense minister. The accumulated funds of  the stabilization fund and half 
the collections from the investment fund were deposited in UCPB without 
interest, spurring rapid growth of the bank. 
A presidential decree  announced  in  1978 allowed the  COCOFED and 
UCPB  to  use  the  funds from  the  coconut levies to  make  investments in 
coconut milling  and  to  purchase existing mills  on  behalf  of  the  coconut 
farmers. After several mills had been acquired, UCPB organized the United 
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downstream  investment  from  the  coconut  levy  funds.  The  bargaining 
position of UCPB and UNICOM in negotiations for the purchase of existing 
mills was strengthened by  a presidential  decree which limited price subsidy 
restitution  payments  to  mills  “owned  by  the  farmers”  (Hawes  1987, 
72-73).  The  effort  to  purchase  oil  mills  also  gained  from  the  severe 
financial losses experienced  by  many  millers  in  1979, when a fall in copra 
production pushed the capacity utilization rate of oil mills below 50 percent. 
By  1980 UNICOM owned thirteen coconut oil mills representing 80 percent 
of  the  country’s  coconut  oil  milling  capacity,  and  managed  two  more, 
bringing its total to over 90 percent  (Ocampo  1980, 45). 
The taxation of coconut production and the control that UNICOM exerted 
over  coconut  milling  created  tremendous  opportunities  for  siphoning  off 
income from the industry.  Despite the number of agencies  involved,  actual 
control of the industry was vested in very few people. One of the directors of 
COCOFED, Eduardo Cojuangco,  was  also head  of the  Philippine Coconut 
Authority, president of UCPB and UNICOM, as well as owner of the hybrid 
seednut  farm. The collections  under  the  Coconut  Consumers  Stabilization 
Fund  and  the  Coconut  Industry  Development  Fund  were  never  subject  to 
audit.  One study done by the  Philippine planning ministry,  NEDA,  put the 
total  levy  collections  at  P.  10  billion  (about  $1 billion  at  1982 exchange 
rates), of  which only P.  2.1 billion was spent to reimburse coconut products 
producers (NEDA  1985, IV-48). A life insurance  scheme  and  a variety of 
scholarship and other assistance funds were set up for coconut farmers and 
their  families, but  actual  disbursements  under  these  programs  were  very 
small.  The  bulk  of  the  funds  went  to Cojuangco’s  hybrid  seednut  farm, 
making him the richest crony in the Philippines. 
In addition to the taxes that were levied on coconut producers, the control 
that UNICOM established over coconut oil milling and the restrictions that 
the  Philippine  government  placed  on  direct  export  of  copra  created  a 
monopsony  buyer  of  copra  within  the  Philippines,  further depressing  the 
returns that coconut farmers got from their crop. UNICOM appears to have 
paid  between  9 and  15 percent  below  the  price  it would  have  paid  under 
competitive conditions for copra supplies (Clarete and Roumasset  1983, 34). 
The power that UNICOM exercised over the industry was demonstrated  in 
1981 when  the  coconut  levy  was  suspended  at the  insistence  of  Finance 
Minister Cesar Virata. UNICOM refused to buy copra or sell coconut oil and 
within five days Marcos restored the levy.5 
As  a  result  of  the  levies  and  the  control  over processing  facilities,  the 
effective taxation of coconut producers increased dramatically during martial 
law.  The combined  effects  of  the  levy  and purchase  arrangements  on  the 
incomes of  coconut farmers have been estimated by Intal and Power (1987) 
and are shown in table 4.2. The domestic copra producer price as a percent 
of  the border price decreased  during the  1960s and  fell precipitously  after 
1979.  Transfers  from  (forgone  income  of) coconut  farmers  averaged  5 469  PhilippinesKhapter 4 
Table 4.2  Nominal Protection Rate and Transfers: Coconuts 
Year 
Share of Transfers 
Nominal Rate of  Transfers"  to Total Value of 
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Suurce: lntal and Power (1987). 
"Transfers are equal to the difference between the actual price received by the producer and the border price, 
adjusted to the farm level, multiplied  by the volume of output. 
bAnnual averages. 
percent during 1961-71,  19 percent during 1972-78,  and 43 percent during 
As  in  the  case  of  sugar,  the  coconut  industry  was  hampered  by  low 
productivity  growth  and  the  absence  of  additional  lands  to open  up  for 
cultivation.  Yields  per  hectare  declined  during  the  1960s and  rose  only 
modestly  during  the  1970s,  despite  higher  world  prices  for  coconut 
products.6 At the  same time  that the rate of effective taxation  increased  in 
the  1980s,  average  yields  dropped  significantly,  and  by  1984-85  total 
production  of  coconuts  was  32  percent  below  its  1978-80  average.' 
Philippine coconut yields have been hampered by the growing senility of the 
stock of  bearing trees, a problem that the replanting program was supposed 
to address.'  In  more general  terms, the world  market  for coconut  oil, the 
major product,  weakened  as a result  of  competition  from soybean oil and 
palm oiL9 In this  second instance,  the  Philippine government  increased its 
taxation of  a sector whose external terms of trade had deteriorated. 
1979-82. 
4.2  Crony Capitalism and Rent Seeking 
The use of government power to distribute wealth  went well beyond the 
traditional  agricultural sector. The 1970s saw the virtual  institutionalization 
of  cronyism  and  rent  seeking  in  the  Philippines.  While the  associates  of 
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known, evidence that has come to light since the overthrow of the Marcos 
government reveals how extensive the interests of the first family and their 
relatives were in the operations of crony firms, and the extent to  which they 
also gained from the associates they fostered. 
Underpinning  cronyism  and  rent  seeking  during  the  1970s  were  the 
centralization of  economic decision making and the distortion  of policies to 
suit particular  firms or individuals.  Under martial  law, Marcos  had  almost 
unlimited  discretionary  power.  Legislation  could be accomplished  through 
presidential decree; in many instances this was nothing more than a scribbled 
acquiesence and signature on a request that had been sent to the president. In 
some cases decrees were not made public until well after their issuance.” 
Access to Marcos became the ultimate determinant of policy;  often policies 
that had been established by the ministries, with Marcos’ concurrence,  were 
overruled by a later presidential decree.  l1 
The  dramatis  personae  of  Philippine  cronyism  during  the  1970s  have 
become  internationally  known,  particularly  since the  fall  of  Marcos  from 
power in  1986. Apart from Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos themselves (who, 
as recent revelations show, extensively used cronies as agents), the most well 
known  include  Roberto  Benedicto  (Marcos’  sugar  czar),  Benjamin  and 
Alfredo  Romualdez  (Mrs.  Marcos’  brothers),  Herminio  Disini,  Rodolfo 
Cuenca, Ricardo  Silverio, Antonio  Floirendo,  and  Eduardo  Cojuangco.  A 
few others, such as Jose Campos, acted as agents for the Marcos family. 
The use of  government power to marshal and distribute wealth worked in 
several  ways.  The first  might  be  termed  standard  graft-the  allocation  of 
government contracts and access to credit from public financial  institutions 
to  favored  individuals  in  return  for  some  interest  or  kickback  from  the 
operations.  While this was certainly not unusual to the Marcos administra- 
tion, the growth of the economy during the 1970s and the rapid expansion of 
the  public  sector  increased  the  possibilities  from  this  source.  Thus  for 
example, the Construction and Development  Corporation of the Philippines 
(CDCP),  run  by  Rodolfo  Cuenca, received  most  of  the  public  works  and 
large  construction  projects  of  the  martial  law  government.  Roberto 
Benedicto’s firm, Integral Factors Corporation,  became the exclusive agent 
of  the  Government  Service  Insurance  System  (GSIS)  and  had  a  virtual 
monopoly  as the insurance broker for government properties.  Jose Campos 
was  granted  the  exclusive  contract  to  provide  all  medical  supplies  to the 
Ministry of  Health. 
The  generation  of  rent  through  kickbacks  on  overpriced  projects  and 
contracts was not uncommon before the 1970s, but the magnitude increased 
substantially during the 1970s. The best known and most controversial case 
was  the  Bataan  nuclear  power  plant  project.  Marcos  chose  the  more 
expensive Westinghouse  proposal brokered by  Herminio Disini  which gave 
Disini, and allegedly the Marcos family, substantial commissions,  as well as 
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received. A recent report detailed the process of  siphoning off Japanese aid 
“in the form of  commissions or rebates from the purchase of equipment as 
well as technical and advisory fees for the implementation of  development 
projects  funded by  yen  credits  from Japan’s  OECF.”I2 The  same report 
indicates that the actual prioritization of  development projects funded with 
Japanese aid depended in part on the willingness of the Japanese companies 
implementing the projects to either pad costs or reduce profit margins, with 
the difference being remitted to the agents of  the top Philippine government 
officials. Rent seeking through the overpricing of  contracts is illustrated by 
the commission fee of  7.5 percent of  the cost of  shipment-instead  of  the 
standard 2.5 percent broker’s fee-charged against the Philippine National 
Oil Company (PNOC) on its oil importations,  with the proceeds from the 
difference allegedly going to  the  foreign bank  accounts of  the top PNOC 
official  (Veloso  1986).  Similarly,  the  typical  procedure  in  sugar  mill 
investments  was  that  the  foreign  supplier  would  price  the  investment 
package to include an allowance for kickbacks to the Filipino proponents 
and/or  government  officials.  These  investments  in  turn  were  financed 
primarily  by  loans  granted  or  guaranteed  by  PNB  (Wideman  1976). 
Wideman  quotes  a  senior  Japanese  government  official  that  Japanese 
businessmen in the Philippines spent on average 12 percent of contract prices 
on kickbacks (1976, 55). 
Historically, access to credit at below market rates was one of the spoils of 
government office in the Philippines. This continued under martial law, but 
the extent of foreign borrowing that took place and the expansion in size of 
government  financial institutions and  financial  institutions associated with 
the  government,  greatly  increased  the  resources  available  through  this 
source, The two  major government financial  institutions,  PNB  and  DBP, 
were  heavily tapped by  the cronies.  “Behest  loans,”  loans granted at the 
request of  the government or its agencies, dominated the loan portfolios of 
the  two  banks.  In  principle,  behest  loans  were  supposed  to  reflect  the 
government’s priority areas where investors were given implicit interest rate 
subsidy given the lower interest rate charged by PNB and DBP relative to the 
prevailing  market  rate.  Apart  from  the  Marinduque  Mining  Corporation 
which  was  the  largest  borrower,  the  major  borrowers  from  PNB  were 
Benedicto, Silverio,  and  Cuenca (Quiambao  1986). The loan portfolio  of 
DBP is less concentrated than PNB’s; nonetheless, apart from mining and 
cement firms,  firms of  cronies like Cuena,  Disini,  Benedicto, and Dewey 
Dee  and  relatives like  the  Martels  figured prominently among  the  major 
borrowers (Tengco 1983). 
The result was that profits in many of  the investment projects undertaken 
during the Marcos years were made at the investment and construction stage 
and  not  from the profitable  operation of  the  facilities constructed.  Public 
loans,  or  publicly  guaranteed  loans,  removed  the  financial discipline  in 
initiating  and  operating  investment  projects.  This  encouraged  shoddy 472  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
construction, as in the case of the nuclear power plant, and in some cases the 
substitution of used equipment when new had been paid for.  It also removed 
much  of  the  market  discipline,  and  led  to  overinvestment  and  excess 
capacity in  such assets as hotels, sugar mills, and cement plants. 
But  cronyism  in  the  Philippines  went  well  beyond  the  simple  graft 
described above. Much of the generation and distribution of  rents was done 
through  the  creation  of  monopoly  positions  or  through  differential  and 
particularistic application of the law and regulation.  The martial  law period 
saw extensive interventions of this type. The monopoly positions created in 
the sugar and coconut industries were two of the most important, however, 
there were many other instances of government-mandated monopolies which 
generated  rents for cronies or relatives.  One of the most  lucrative  was  the 
gambling  monopoly,  especially the profitable  casinos  and jai alai stadium, 
granted  to  Benjamin  Romualdez.  Rodolfo  Cuenca’s  Galleon  Shipping 
Corporation  was  the  only  Philippine  flag  carrier  permitted  to  operate 
container ships from America’s West Coast to  the Philippines.  A monopoly 
on meat importation from Australia and New Zealand was given to a private 
group  which  worked  along  with  the  Bureau  of  Animal  Industries.  The 
coconut-chemical  plant  set  up  by  Cojuangco  was  given  the  sole  right  to 
import alkyl benzene, an input in making detergents, as well as the exclusive 
right  to import products  that  would  compete  with  the  plant’s  output.  In 
another  example  of  a  firm  being  given  exclusive  rights  to  import  the 
competing product, Peroxide Philippines was the only firm allowed to import 
peroxide  (Sicat  1986, 29,  31;  Canlas  et al.  1984, 74).  In some instances 
these  monopolies  were  exercised  directly  by  government  agencies-the 
National Grains Authority,  later renamed  the National  Food Authority,  was 
given  exclusive rights in wheat  importation  and domestic flour distribution 
(Sicat  1986,  23-25).  Even  Imelda  Marcos’  Cultural  Center  of  the 
Philippines  earned  substantial  income  as the  country’s  sole  distributor  of 
pornographic movies. 
In other instances,  exemptions  from taxes or duties or other differential 
application  of  the  law  created  competitive  advantages  that  conferred 
substantial  benefits  and, in some cases, monopolies,  to the receiving  firm. 
For example, Disini’s flagship firm became the largest and dominant seller of 
cigarette filters in the country when the government  set a tariff  rate of  100 
percent  on  the  raw  material  imports  of  competing  foreign-owned  firms, 
while  Disini’s firm faced  a tariff  rate of only  10 percent  (Sacerdoti  1983, 
50). One of the reasons for the emergence of  Ricardo  Silverio’s  firm, the 
Delta  Motors  Corporation,  the  sole  assembler  and  distributor  of  Toyota 
automobiles in the Philippines, as the industry leader was that competing car 
assembly firms were allowed to offset through their exports of manufactured 
components  only  15  percent  of  the  local-content  requirement  for  cars 
assembled and sold in the country, while Silverio’s firm was exempted from 
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allowed  tax  free  importation  of  unassembled  black  and  white  TV  sets, 
ostensibly  for  distribution  to  the  rural  population;  however,  Nivico’s 
television sets were readily available in Manila. Antonio Floirendo’s fast rise 
to fortune occurred when his firm,  TADECO, was able to secure the use of 
large tracts of land that were ideal for bananas from the Davao Penal Colony. 
As  part  of  the  plantation  development  agreement  with  the  penal  colony, 
Floirendo’s firm hired  live-out  prisoners who were paid  much less than the 
prevailing wage rate (David, Barker, and Palacpac  1984). 
During  the  martial  law  years  the  distinction  between  public  policy  and 
private  action for economic gain was often blurred.  The case of the Bataan 
Shipyard and Engineering Company  (BASECO)  serves as an illustration. l3 
BASECO, a private corporation,  was an offshoot of the president’s directive 
to  privatize  the  ship  repair  and  building  industry  as part  of  the  national 
policy  of  relying  on  private  enterprise  as  a  catalyst  for  development. 
BASECO acquired, although never paid for, the assets of a government firm, 
the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation.  A presidential decree required 
the  government’s  Maritime  Industry  Authority  to draw  up  a  shipbuilding 
program  which,  a  confidential  memorandum  to  the  president  from  his 
brother-in-law  stated, “would then be a source of ship orders for BASECO” 
(Espinosa  1986, 6).  And  BASECO  did  land  millions  of  pesos  worth  of 
contracts with the Bureau of Public Works and the Philippine Navy.  Marcos 
took  a  special  interest  in  the  corporation;  he  transferred  the  title  for 
Engineering Island from the National Development Corporation to BASECO 
and  ordered  the  Bureau  of  Public  Works  to  improve  the  facilities  at 
Engineering  Island  and  Mariveles.  He  also  intervened  in  BASECO’s 
application for loans.  The investigation by  the Presidential Commission  on 
Good  Government  (PCGG),  established  by  Corazon  Aquino  in  1986, 
explains Marcos’ active interventions: the firm  was probably owned by him, 
and the published owners were largely front men. 
The use of government power to effect the transfer of assets from private 
titleholders to members of  the Marcos  “inner circle” at minimal or no cost 
was also a characteristic of crony capitalism.  This included the forced sales 
of  assets that were justified as ways to weaken the country’s oligarchs,  but 
were as much matters of personal vengeance. This is best exemplified by the 
case of the Lopez family, whose controlling interests in the Manila Electric 
Company and newspaper publishing facilities were taken over by Benjamin 
Romualdez,  and  whose  radio  and television  facilities  were  turned  over to 
Roberto  Benedi~to.’~  Another  prominent  businessman  who  stood  up  to 
Marcos, Fernando Jacinto, had his business in steel smelting and processing 
(which  had  substantial  government  exposure)  effectively  nationalized  and 
managed  by  military  officers  (Mijares  1976,  192).  Various  methods  were 
used  to  effect  asset  transfer  including:  (1)  the  automatic  foreclosure  of 
mortgages  on  properties  used  as  collateral  in  obtaining  loans  from 
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Marcos or his cronies by  businesses in  undertakings requiring presidential 
approval; and  (3) the setting aside of  public lands for the ownership and 
business use of favored individuals (193-95). 
The business empires of  the most prominent cronies were built through 
acquisitions of  existing  firms.  In  many  cases,  these  sales  were  less  than 
voluntary and occurred at below market prices,  since Marcos,  and cronies 
acting with his support, could bring substantial pressure to bear. In the case 
of  a utility company, it might be the assurance that no rate increases would 
be  forthcoming  for  the  existing  owners;  in  others,  the  firms  would  be 
threatened with labor troubles or closure for health and sanitary reasons. And 
in some cases, the recognition that government policy was skewed in favor 
of certain firms in the industry would cause existing firms to sell out, hoping 
to salvage some of the value of their assets by  selling early. 
The rise of  the cronies took place in a very short time,  a period  of just 
four to six years. With access to credit and the backing of the government, 
their business organizations expanded extremely rapidly in nearly all sectors 
of  the economy. Cronies controlled wholly or owned a substantial share of 
businesses in  such areas as agricultural export  (sugar and coconut milling 
and trading, bananas), banking and finance, broadcasting and print media, 
construction, communications, car and truck manufacturing and distribution, 
gambling, mining, logging, electricity generation and distribution, pharma- 
ceuticals,  transportation,  tobacco  and  beverages,  real  estate,  machinery 
distribution, shipping and ship repair, and oil and coal exploration. Among 
the  major  cronies  and  relatives,  Eduardo  Cojuangco  controlled  or  had 
substantial shares in around seventy firms, and Roberto Benedicto in some 
fifty  firms.  Benjamin  Romualdez  controlled  or  had  substantial  shares  in 
around fifty firms, and Herminio Disini in fifty-one firms.I5 
None  of  these practices outlined above were  unique to the Philippines. 
Government corruption and favoritism, kickbacks from investment projects, 
grants of  exclusive privilege,  and pressure on asset  holders to  sell out to 
firms close to the current government, have all been features at various times 
of  other  countries.  These  practices  were  more  extensive  and  more 
remunerative in  the Philippines than elsewhere.  But there still remains the 
question of why these practices seemed to have had such a debilitating effect 
on  the Philippine economy, given their existence in other, more successful, 
economies.  In  fact,  maintenance  of  below  market  interest  rates,  the 
allocation of bank credit to favored firms, and the encouragement of business 
concentration have been features in some of the most successful economies 
in the region. Arguably, crony capitalism was little different from the growth 
of  zaibatsu in  interwar  Japan  and  the  growth  of  the  chaebol  in  postwar 
Korea.  In  those  two  countries  economic  concentration  and  government 
intervention on behalf of favored firms appear to have been powerful engines 
of growth, if  not of economic equality. This was in fact the way in which the 
crony system was justified in the Philippines on the few occasions when the 
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the government explained, were an energetic and entrepreneurial group that 
would do for the Philippines what similar industrialists had done in  Korea 
and Japan. l6 
There were numerous differences between the Philippine experience with 
industrial concentration and  that  of  Japan  and  Korea,  but  what  was most 
fundamental was the inability to maintain and foster market competition. In 
both  Japan  and  Korea  there  was  a  substantial  degree  of  overlap  in  the 
industrial base of the large industrial groupings, so that in most markets there 
were several firms, each from a different industrial group.  It was true that 
credit, foreign exchange, allowable investment, and other opportunities were 
channeled  to  firms  in  the  large  groups,  but  the  amounts  were  primarily 
determined  on  a  performance  basis.  Those  firms  that  were  the  most 
successful exporters or who had the largest share of a particular market were 
rewarded with the largest allocation. While there was an ethos of  fostering 
national firms, there were limits on the amount of discretion that bureaucrats 
could exercise and rarely,  if ever, were individual firms or groups given a 
particular benefit at the expense of the others.  Exporting was a priority in 
both Japan and Korea, each maintained relatively open trading systems, and 
there was little that the government could do explicitly to assure the financial 
success of  a firm in the export market. 
In  the  Philippines,  in  contrast,  there  was  a  far  greater  degree  of 
governmental discretion,  as  well  as  extensive  application  of  the  law  and 
regulation  in  particularistic  form.  Almost  anything could  be  arranged  by 
presidential decree,  and the president in many cases had  a direct financial 
interest in  the  success of  particular  ventures.  Unlike in  Korea and Japan, 
there was little or no industrial overlap among crony enterprises; individual 
monopoly positions were created and awarded to single firms. Thus, there 
was little competition in individual industries.  l7 
Finally, the Philippine trading system was less open than that of Japan or 
Korea, and the country was less successful in channeling entrepreneurship 
into the export  sector. Philippine cronies tended to focus their energies  in 
nontraded  goods  sectors  and  the  more  protected  industries.  Among 
nontraded  goods  industries,  the  cronies  had  prominent  shares  in  power, 
communications,  construction,  finance,  transportation,  and  distribution 
services. They also had large shares in heavily protected industries such as 
automobile assembly and  chemicals.  The cronies were involved in  export 
industries, but primarily in rent-gathering resource activities such as logging, 
mining rights, and control of sugar and coconut trading and processing. 
Because the nontradable sector tends to grow only in response to growth 
in  national  income,  crony  enterprise  growth  took  place  through  the 
acquisition of  existing firms rather than the establishment of  new ones, and 
since  the  domestic market  was  protected  from  competition,  income  was 
almost  assured  from  the  exercise  of  monopoly  positions.18  Thus  the 
emphasis of the crony entrepreneurs was on the appropriation of rents rather 
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less attractive way to wealth than was extraction of surplus from the existing 
economy. 
By the end of the 1970s the scale of government favoritism and cronyism 
in  the Philippines was such as to constitute a serious drag on the domestic 
economy. In some cases, such as sugar and coconuts, the taxes on producers 
were so great  that  they  debilitated  the underlying  industry.  In  industry  the 
effect was the demoralization  of the private,  nonassociated  business  sector. 
Since the cronies built their business empires extensively  by acquiring firms 
in  a  range of  industries,  there  was a  reluctance  on the  part  of  domestic 
businessmen to become too large or too profitable and thus draw the attention 
of  someone  close  to  the  Marcos  government.  The  term  used  in  the 
Philippines to describe the reaction of  cronies to profitable firms was “saliva 
capitali~m.”’~  There was also a reluctance  to enter new  lines of  business, 
since  a  firm  could  not  be  sure  whether  its  competitor firms  in  the  new 
activity were connected with the government or not. 
Businessmen,  when  they  could,  acted  to  protect  their  firms  from  the 
acquisitive impulse of the Marcos government and its cronies. Firms sought 
foreign joint venture partners on the assumption that the government would 
be  less  likely  to  move  against  the  assets  of  a  foreign  firm.  But  even 
foreign-owned  firms  faced  pressure  to sell  out  to the cronies. Procter  and 
Gamble, Lever Brothers, and Cargill were forced to sell their coconut mills 
to UNICOM. Foreign companies responded  when they could by  participat- 
ing  in  U.S.  or multilateral  financial programs.  Union  Oil  Company came 
under heavy pressure to sell its operations, but dissuaded the government by 
its participation  in  U.S.  Overseas Private Investment  Corporation (OPIC) 
insurance  and its  threats  to force  the  United  States to undertake a  public 
investigation.  Other companies used  participation  with  the  World  Bank’s 
International Finance Company to discourage a takeover. *’ 
The other  way  in  which  firms  responded  was  by  moving  their  assets 
beyond  the  reach  of  the government through  capital flight.  The issue  of 
capital flight is dealt with below in chapter 6. As we argue in that chapter, 
the  real  increase  in  capital  flight  came  well  before  the  assassination  of 
Benign0 Aquino, starting as early as 1980. 
As a result, less investment was undertaken by firms that were motivated 
by  efficiency  and  profit,  and  more  of  domestic  investment  and  activity 
shifted  toward  the government and those  who  could  count on benefitting 
from government action. The failure of the economy to respond to the sharp 
increases  in government  investment expenditure during  the early 1980s, in 
contrast to the response of  the private sector after the first oil shock, was one 
indication of  the weakening that had taken place. 
4.3  The Fiscal Burden of Crony Capitalism 
The rapid growth  of  the crony  business  empires was based on access to 
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and, in some cases, directly from foreign lenders. But in addition, several of 
the cronies, Disini and Cuenca in particular, borrowed short-term funds from 
the  domestic  commercial  paper  market.  In  going  to  the  domestic  market, 
these  individuals  could  draw  on  the  strength  of  their  names  and  on  the 
widespread perception that they were close to the Marcos government.  Since 
they were expanding rapidly, their operations were highly leveraged, leaving 
them  vulnerable  to  a  downturn  in  domestic  business  conditions  or  to 
financial shocks. Both occurred in  1981. 
Despite the  attempts of the  Marcos  government  to counteract  the  world 
recession,  the  rate  of  output  growth  slid  in  1981. In  addition,  the  sudden 
departure of Dewey Dee, a Chinese businessman who had borrowed heavily 
in the  commercial paper  market,  led to a domestic  financial  crisis and  the 
collapse  of  the  short-term  money  market  upon  which  many  firms  were 
dependent. During the Dewey Dee crisis, described in more detail in the next 
chapter,  the  central  bank  extended  emergency  funding  to  the  financial 
institutions  that  had  been  caught  in  the  liquidity  crisis.  Faced  with  the 
bankruptcy  of  numerous large firms, the Philippine government established 
an  industrial  rescue  fund  for  corporations  that  had  been  affected.  The 
industrial  rescue fund was originally set at P.  1.5 billion,  but the limit was 
later raised  to P.  5  billion  as  the  extent  of  the  corporate  distress  became 
evident. 
As a result,  the government corporate equity position  increased dramati- 
cally beginning with this episode. The Philippine government, either directly 
or  through  public  financial  institutions,  converted  loans  into  equity  and 
assumed the foreign obligations of the rescued firms, most of  which carried 
public  guarantees.  Not  all  the  firms  rescued  were  those  that  belonged  to 
Marcos  cronies;  the  largest  industrial  failure  of  this  period  was  the 
Marinduque  Mining  Corporation,  which  had  built  a  nickel  refinery  with 
substantial  government  participation  and  which  was  hit  by  higher  energy 
prices and the downturn in world metals markets. But many of the firms that 
were bailed out were those of the most prominent and aggressive cronies. 
One of  the  largest firms was CDCP, owned  by  Rodolfo Cuenca. In two 
letters  of  instruction  in  February  1981, President  Marcos  ordered  PNB, 
GSIS, and two other  state  financial  institutions  to take over the  company. 
Debts totaling P.  3.9 billion  ($490 million) were converted into equity, and 
the government injected an additional P.  1.1 billion in new funds, giving the 
government  a total  interest of  P.  5.1 billion  in the  firm.21  Management  of 
CDCP was transferred to the National Development Corporation (NDC), but 
Cuenca was allowed to maintain a minority  share.22 Ricardo Silverio’s Delta 
Motors  Corporation  was  also  forced  under  in  the  domestic  recession  and 
financial crisis. Debts to PNB of P.  1 billion were turned into equity, and an 
additional P.  150 million was provided, giving PNB a 70 percent share in the 
company. 
The extensive corporate empire of Herminio Disini fell apart as a result of 
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heavily  affected  by  the  crisis  and  received  substantial  support  from  the 
central  bank.  Disini’s  business  operations  were  highly  leveraged:  his 
principal  firm, Philippine Tobacco Filters,  had  a  1O:l  debvequity ratio.  Of 
the 5 1 companies in the Herdis Group in 198  1, 7 were ultimately retained by 
Disini,  18 were taken over by government  agencies (17 by the NDC), and 
the remainder were sold, reorganized, or wound up (Ibon 1983b, 7-8).  Total 
government exposure to the Herdis Group was estimated at P.  4.6 billion.23 
Disini left the Philippines shortly thereafter and retired in Austria. 
The  recession  and  financial  crisis  affected  the  cronies  involved  in  the 
industrial sector. The cronies whose business interests were primarily in the 
agricultural  sector-Eduardo  Cojuangco, Roberto Benedicto,  and  Antonio 
Fiorendo-survived  with most of their holdings intact. Both Cojuangco and 
Benedicto were cushioned by their control of  trading in their industries and, 
in addition, had greater access to bank credit-Cojuangco  from the UCPB, 
which  received  the  coconut  levy  proceeds,  and  Benedicto  from PNB, the 
traditional  source of credit for the sugar industry, and his own Traders Royal 
Bank, where the casino earnings were deposited. 
Government  financial  institutions  that  extended  credit  to  domestic 
corporations  ended  up  with  ownership  positions  in  a  variety  of  domestic 
firms.  PNB  and  its  subsidiary,  the  National  Investment  and  Development 
Corporation,  had large  stakes in CDCP, Delta Motors, Pilipinas Bank, and 
full  ownership  of  a passenger  bus  company.  DBP had  equity  holdings  of 
over one billion pesos in Marinduque Mining, several textile manufacturers, 
and  Philippine  Blooming  Mills,  and  had  major  equity  stakes  in  banks, 
hotels,  pulp and paper mills,  and cement plants.24 Total equity holdings of 
DBP jumped from 11.6 percent of its assets in 1980 to 18.0 percent in  1982, 
and totaled P.  7.9 billion  (about $930 million).25 The social insurance fund 
for public workers, the GSIS, gained controlling shares in two banks.  But it 
was  NDC,  headed  by  the  minister of  trade  and industry,  that  became  the 
major holdedmanager of distressed firms, with a list of eight-two firms at the 
end  of  1982, spanning  basic  metals,  textiles,  pulp  and  paper,  fertilizer, 
banking, chemicals,  and mining (Montelibano  1983). 
The  financial  extension  of  the  government  to  the  firms  owned  by 
presidential cronies and others exacted a heavy fiscal toll. Exactly how much 
additional  government  expenditure  took  place  as a  result  of  the  financial 
crisis and  string of  corporate  failures  is  difficult  to determine.  Adding  up 
extensions of funds to the most publicized  firms gives a figure of at least P. 
3.8 billion,  roughly  1.3 percent  of  GNP and  11 percent  of  government 
revenues. Another way to approach this question is to look at the increase in 
national  government equity contributions  to the institutions involved in the 
rescue operations. These are shown in table 4.3. Using the  1980 figure as a 
base  gives an  additional equity  contribution  totaling  P.  3.1 billion  in  1981 
and  1982, which  does  not  count  the  contributions  of  other  agencies  of 
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Table 4.3  National Government Equity Contributions (in millions of pesos, cash basis) 
1980  1981  1982  1983 
Central bank  38  583  325  25 
Philippine National Bank  72  210  160  150 
Total  813  2.766  1.985  58  I 
Development Bank of  the Philippines  85  300  607  0 
National Development Corporation  618  1,813  893  406 
Percent of  budget  2. I  5.8  3.8  1.1 
Source:  Philippines, Government Corporate Monitoring Committee, unpublished data 
The rescue operations were strongly criticized within the private sector not 
closely  associated  with  the  Marcos government as rewarding inefficiency, 
bailing  out cronies of  Marcos’ family,  and unfairly  encroaching upon  the 
province of  private firms.26 The government defended its actions by saying 
that the firms rescued represented the largest employers in the country and to 
have let them  fail would  have  meant  tremendous economic cost. Although 
the  losses  to  the  Marcos  cronies  were  not  as  harsh  as  could  have  been 
applied, they did lose control over the bulk of their companies, were forced 
to sell others, and in some cases were barred  from reentering  the industry. 
The episode does appear to have been a victory for the technocrats over the 
cronies in the industrial sector, but at considerable economic cost. The most 
visible  cost  was the huge increase  in  government outlays required  for the 
rescue  operations.  But much of  the effect  was housed  in  the  deteriorating 
portfolios of state-owned financial institutions, examined in detail in the next 
chapter.  By  the  mid- 1980s,  the  almost  complete  disintegration  of  the 
portfolios  of  state-owned  financial  institutions  would  become  the  most 
serious fiscal problem of  the Philippine government. 
4.4  Cronyism in Philippine Politics and the Economy 
The impact  of  government corruption,  rent  seeking,  and  favoritism  is 
more easily described than quantified. It is not sufficient nor is it accurate to 
say that the slide of the Philippines into debt crisis was simply the result of 
wholesale plunder by Marcos and his associates that drove the economy into 
the  ground.  But  neither  is  it  sufficient  to  describe  corruption  in  the 
Philippines as a marginal effect of economic activity, analogous to a turnover 
tax on economic activity.  The intervention,  monopolization, and acquisition 
of the martial law government and Marcos cronies changed the nature of the 
economy in the Philippines, weakened the efficiency and profit motivation of 
its actors, and postponed or made more difficult economic adjustments to an 
increasing adverse international environment. 
The strongest  and  most  visible  effect  was  on the two  most  important 
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cronyism  discouraged  activity  by  other  businessmen  and  investors,  and 
encouraged  capital  flight.  The operations  of  the  cronies, particularly  their 
growth through acquisition, accentuated  the tendency  in the Philippines  for 
high financial  leveraging and dependence on short-term borrowing, both of 
which  increased  the  vulnerability  of  the  economy to domestic, as well  as 
international,  financial crises.  And when the implicit government guarantee 
that Marcos cronies enjoyed was called in the early 1980s, the excessive risk 
and  bad  management  that  the cronies had  undertaken was  socialized  and 
became an enormous fiscal burden. 
While the economic importance of crony capitalism was considerable, it 
cannot  be  understood  simply  as  a  matter  of  economics  and  wealth 
accumulation. Government intervention,  monopolization,  and cronyism was 
also fundamentally a way of establishing and maintaining the political power 
of  the  martial  law  regime.  Marcos  and  martial  law  represented  a  direct 
challenge to the traditional elite that had dominated Philippine politics in this 
century,  and the neutralization  of  that elite was a crucial  challenge for the 
regime.  The seizure of the assets of  the Lopez and Jacinto families and the 
initial  activity in  land  reform were  as much  measures  to threaten  potential 
opponents, as they were economic and distribution policies. The nationaliza- 
tion  of  sugar trading  and its transfer  to a trusted  crony were  important in 
establishing control over an industry that had traditionally been the source of 
wealth and influence in the Philippines. 
In the  same vein, interventions  in  major sectors of  the economy, either 
directly  by  the  state,  or  through  actions  which  favored  associates  of  the 
government, created  powerful  incentives  for cooperation  with  the  martial 
law  regime,  as  well  as  powerful  means  to  threaten  those  who  did  not. 
Furthermore,  wealth  and  patronage  had  always been  a  key  to  Philippine 
politics, and the early generation of rents was seen by Marcos in those terms. 
In later years, perhaps, wealth  would  become more of  an end in itself. In 
addition, once created, the cronies had  their own autonomy  and  influence 
and in some ways may have controlled their creator. 
This political transformation  in the Philippines  was as much at the center 
of  martial  law policy  as was  the rapid  development of  the economy.  This 
required a more powerful and centralized government in the Philippines,  and 
this  was  facilitated  by  the  willingness  of  foreign  donors,  multilateral 
institutions, and commercial lenders to assist a government that had pledged 
to undertake economic reform  and increased  developmental  investment. It 
was  also facilitated  by  the  preference  of  all  three  for publicly  guaranteed 
obligations,  which further channeled resources through the state. The debate 
within development economics of the merits of employing domestic savings 
or  foreign  resources  for  investment  has  largely  ignored  the  institutional 
aspects  of  this  choice,  but  this  made  an  important  difference  in  the 
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Financial resources were key to the martial law regime and to Philippine 
cronyism. The financial vulnerability of the cronies also brought about their 
downfall,  as domestic financial crisis led  to  corporate failure  and  then  to 
government rescue at great cost. Financial markets and issues are the next 
subject to which we turn. 
5  The Philippine Financial System 
and the Debt Crisis 
Financial  markets  played  a  central  role  in  the  events  leading  up  to  the 
Philippine debt crisis of  1983 and the difficulties of  the adjustment period 
that followed. A crisis in the domestic commercial paper market touched off 
the  first round  of  corporate and  financial institution  failures,  which  led to 
fiscal rescue operations by the Philippine government. By  1984 losses within 
the government-owned  financial institutions became a tremendous drain on 
fiscal resources, complicating both the achievement of external balance and 
the fostering of recovery in the country. This chapter examines the financial 
system in more detail, considering both its contribution to increasing foreign 
indebtedness in the Philippines and its contributions to Philippine macroeco- 
nomic difficulties in the  1980s. 
5.1  Financial Institutions and Markets 
The  following  provides  a  brief  tour  of  the  financial  system  in  the 
Philippines.  The  aim  here  is  not  to  be  exhaustive,  but  to  provide  an 
introduction to the important players in the debt story. 
5.1.1  Capital Market 
As  is the case in other LDCs, the capital or securities market is not well 
developed in the Philippines and has provided an almost insignificant share 
of total funds raised for private investment. There were 184 companies listed 
on the Manila and Makati stock exchanges in 1983, and the total capitalized 
value  of  listed  shares amounted  to $800 million,  or roughly  2 percent  of 
Philippine  GDP.2 Corporate  bond  issues,  while  not  unknown,  have  been 
insignificant. The size of the primary corporate security market can also be 
judged from the low number of public offerings, averaging roughly thirty per 
year (World Bank and IMF 1980, 23). 
There has been a much larger volume of public securities issued, but there 
have been  only limited  private  holdings  and  almost no secondary  trading. 